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The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. This paper reports on a survey carried out among OECD government debt managers on the use of bond buybacks and exchange operations. The survey shows that government debt managers use extensively bond buybacks and exchanges (often referred to as "switches") as liability management tools.
BUYBACK AND EXCHANGE OPERATIONS: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES AMONG OECD PUBLIC DEBT MANAGERS
Before discussing the details of the survey results, this introductory section provides background on the reasons for conducting these operations. It also discusses the practical challenges in using these important liability management tools.
Main reasons for using bond exchanges and buybacks
Bond exchanges and buyback operations serve two main purposes. First, by reducing the outstanding amounts of bonds close to maturity, exchanges and buybacks help in reducing roll-over peaks and thus lowering refinancing risk.
Second, exchanges and buybacks allow debt managers to increase the issuance of on-the-run securities above and beyond what would otherwise have been possible. The resulting more rapid build-up of new bonds enhances market liquidity of these securities. This in turn should eventually be reflected in higher bond prices. Hence, bond exchanges and buybacks are aimed at lowering refinancing risk. In addition these operations may also contribute to lower funding costs for governments.
Chart 1: Buybacks combined with increased on-the-run issuance
Source: Government Debt Management, Danmarks Nationalbank.
Chart 1 shows a stylised example of buybacks combined with new issuance of on-the-run securities.
To that end, we shall use the (domestic currency) redemption profile of Denmark. Buybacks are performed in closest-to-maturity bonds, while buybacks are funded with increased issuance of on-the-run securities, (in this case in the 2-, 5-and 10-years segments). As discussed in section 3 (survey results), this example is representative in the sense that the combination 'closest-to-maturity bonds' and 'off-the-run securities' is most often targeted for buyback operations. However, buybacks may also take place without any new issuance activity; for example, as a response to unexpected government income. Buyback operations can involve one or multiple bonds.
Chart 2 illustrates a typical bond exchange scenario. In this example the stock of 'off-the-run bonds'
(the 'source bond') is being reduced, while (as part of one single operation) the stock of new on-the-run bonds (the 'destination bond') is simultaneously increased. As a result, the liquidity of the target bond is enhanced. Although the outstanding amount of the source bond declines -and liquidity therefore tends to decline -regular buyback and exchange operations would ensure that investors can fairly easily liquidate their holdings of the off-the-run bond. A bond exchange operation may be carried out as a simple exchange of a one source bond against another destination bond or as a more complex operation involving multiple source and/or destination bonds. Close-t o-mat urit y of f -t he-runs On t he runs Amount out st anding, DKK billion Chart 2: A bond exchange operation Source: Government Debt Management, Danmarks Nationalbank.
Other reasons for conducting bond exchanges and buybacks
Other reasons for conducting buyback and exchange operations include the use of surplus cash 1 to buy back outstanding debt.
These operations can also be used to smooth the redemption profile -including points further out on the government yield curve. For instance, a country that financed large borrowing needs in the past, may have a large stock of outstanding medium-term maturities. By addressing such large stocks ('bullets') in a timely fashion, debt managers can limit the need for more aggressive buybacks later on.
Buybacks and exchanges may also be used to correct instances of perceived 'mispricing' along the Of f -t he-run 10-year bond On-t he-run 10-year bond Amount out st anding, DKK Billion " Source"
" Destination"
Advantages and disadvantages of bond exchanges and buybacks
As noted, bond exchanges combine buyback and issuance operations in a single operation, Not only take issuance and buyback operations place at the exact same time, but they are also operationally linked in the sense that a market participant must either take part in both operations or not at all. Bond exchanges have advantages and disadvantages compared to the situation where issuance and buybacks are not strictly linked.
Relative to buybacks, exchange operations allow investors to avoid interest rate and execution risk.
When an investor is allotted an amount in the buyback operation, he/she will also be allotted the corresponding quantity in the issuance operation. In this way investors can avoid the interest rate and execution risk that would arise when they would sell part of their holdings without simultaneously acquiring replacement assets. This relative advantage is likely to be more pronounced in periods of market turmoil, where high interest-rate volatility, wide bid-ask spreads and reduced market depth would tend to make portfolio rebalancing via the secondary market more risky.
Similar advantages would accrue to government issuers who can buy back outstanding bonds while simultaneously securing the funding of that buyback.
These advantages of exchanges relative to buybacks are, however, partly offset by the so-called 'coincidence of needs' problem: in order to participate in a specific bond exchange operation, investors would of course need to have an interest to trade in the given direction in exactly those exchange bonds on offer. This requirement may significantly dampen demand. Debt managers may try to alleviate this problem by offering multiple source and/or destination bonds, although the operational complexity of exchange operations will necessarily increase.
The link between prefunding, liquidity buffers and buybacks
Partly as a response to the funding pressures since the financial crisis erupted, there has been a tendency among some government issuers to issue more than what is strictly needed in a given year. One can distinguish between two different motives for such 'excess or extra issuance'.
The first motive is to prefund known future liabilities, most notably close-to-maturity government bonds, in periods with high uncertainty about economic growth and high market volatility. In that situation, governments, that enjoy currently good access to capital markets at relatively favourable borrowing costs, may decide to prefund.
The second motive for excess issuance is to create a 'liquidity buffer'. Such a buffer could be used against unforeseen shocks, such as unexpected financing needs related to bank rescue operations. Another use of such a liquidity buffer is to redeem maturing debt in a (unexpected) situation with (much) higher borrowing costs.
Hence, the 'liquidity buffer' approach encompasses the use of liquid assets to cover unforeseen financing needs, whereas a 'prefunding' approach is focused on reducing future borrowing requirements.
This conceptual difference is important for understanding the interplay between exchanges/buybacks on the one hand and prefunding and liquidity buffer on the other.
For example, if the purpose of excess issuance is the creation of a liquidity buffer, then there is little or no room for buybacks. Clearly, buybacks would reduce or undermine extra issuance operations for creating a liquidity buffer.
If, on the other hand, the purpose is to prefund (part of) future borrowing requirements, then the question is how to invest the proceeds in the meantime (i.e. until future debt needs to be paid back). Such a prefunding policy does not require that the proceeds are invested in (highly) liquid assets, but only that the funds should be available to redeem bonds at a targeted point in time in the (near) future. Hence, a debt manager can choose to hold the proceeds in either very liquid form or to invest it in some (credit-risk free)
instruments that match the maturity of the liabilities that are being pre-funded. Obviously, the closest match possible between assets and liabilities is achieved simply by buying back the liabilities that are being prefunded.
In practice, governments may choose a mixed strategy by both prefunding close-to-maturity liabilities and by maintaining or creating a liquidity buffer of a specific preferred size. This combination of two 'pure' strategies involves buybacks operations while at the same time leaving a specific amount of cash as liquid buffer. Clearly, in such a 'mixed strategy' the debt manager faces a trade-off between the costs and benefits of buybacks (further discussed below).
Accounting considerations related to buyback operations and exchanges
Buybacks can have a non-trivial impact on the reporting of government deficit and debt figures. In some circumstances, buyback operations may involve a trade-off between the size of interest costs on the one hand, and the size of the outstanding stock of debt on the other. For example, exchanging old, high coupon bonds for on-the-run bonds with prices much closer to par, will lead to lower annual debt charges in the following years. However, the nominal stock of debt will increase.
Take, as illustration, a government that has (i) a relatively large deficit, but (ii) a modest debt-to-GDP ratio. By conducting massive buybacks in old, high-coupon bonds, the government could in principle reduce deficits in the longer term at the expense of a higher nominal debt. In the short run, however, buybacks may have an adverse impact on government deficits. For example, situations where DMOs are buying back old, high-coupon bonds that are trading significantly above par. The entire associated capital loss need then to be recorded in the public accounts in the year of the buyback. This, in turn, may lead to a significant increase in the government deficit in the current (buyback) year. In extreme cases this can amount to several percentage points of GDP.
Moreover, in countries where strict limits on deficits are in place, capital losses related to buybacks would need to be offset by reductions in other government outlays. This may render buybacks and exchanges less appealing. From this perspective it is important to assess the potential impact of the content of fiscal rules on the use of buybacks (and switches). For example, strict fiscal rules for deficits could induce governments to use buybacks (and bond exchanges) to comply with these rules.
When assessing the accounting effects of bond exchanges and buybacks, it is important to keep in mind that they reflect essentially the notion that government balance sheets typically are not being markedto-market. In market-value terms, bond exchanges and buybacks would of course be wholly neutral with respect to the debt level. The main rationale for reporting the government debt in nominal (as opposed to market value) terms is that government debt is essentially a 'hold-to-maturity' portfolio. Arguably, from this perspective at least, market value accounting would introduce (undesirable) volatility in government deficits. Buybacks and switches inherently conflict with the notion of public debt being held to maturity,
and this is what is mirrored in the aforementioned accounting effects.
SECTION 2: Practical challenges in conducting bond exchanges and buybacks

Measuring the cost effectiveness of buybacks and exchanges
As noted, buybacks and exchanges are used for different reasons, in particular for reducing roll-over peaks and lowering interest costs due to the enhanced liquidity of on-the-run bonds. Clearly, private market participants are aware of these policy considerations and motives of the issuer. Depending on their own portfolio composition preferences, they may demand a premium when selling their holdings. The issuer may therefore have to pay a certain 'buyback premium', which may, at least partly, off-set the cost reductions sought from better liquidity in on-the-run securities.
For judging if a debt buyback is worthwhile from a cost-effectiveness perspective, a debt manager need to determine how a given bond is being priced in the secondary market. However, judging the 'relative value' of different debt instruments across the yield curve can be quite a challenge. First of all, prices need to be judged relative to some metric. A natural choice would be the government's own yield curve. For bonds lying in maturity segments well spanned by other bonds on the curve -for example in the 5-year segment -the yield curve spread can usually be determined quite robustly. An even better procedure is to estimate the curve without using the buyback bond. It can then be priced off a curve estimated using all the other (remaining) bonds. This would eliminate any bias introduced by the buyback bond itself.
However, buyback operations are usually targeted at close-to-maturity bonds. Unfortunately, at the short end of the curve, relative pricing often becomes more delicate. For example, on-the-run treasury bills may be priced somewhat differently from old, close-to-maturity coupon bonds (with similar remaining maturities). It may therefore be advisable to eliminate treasury bills from the estimation of the bond yield curve. This would often mean that the buyback bond would be the shortest bond on the estimated curve. In that case, the estimated yield curve spread is not likely to be particularly accurate.
An alternative pricing metric assesses relative values based on the yield curve spread relative to another (benchmark) sovereign's yield curve. However, this metric, by computing spreads relative to another sovereign yield curve, may be influenced by special factors (in particular regarding credit risk) in several segments of the foreign yield curve. This may in turn distort computed spreads.
A third metric is based on the computation of spreads relative to the (OIS) swap curve. This measure may be less distorted by special factors such as credit risk effects. Chart 3 represents an example which shows that pricing results can differ widely depending on the choice of curve. The circles mark for each baseline yield curve the bond that is the most 'expensive' one.
For example, the shortest bond is found to be the most expensive (by computing yield curve spreads relative to the domestic government curve), while it is potentially affected by a buyback premium of up to 10 basis points. Often quite different conclusions could follow from the use of an alternative curve as pricing metric. For example, by using the spreads relative to the German yield curve we reach an opposite conclusion for the shortest bond. This bond is now found to be the cheapest [trading at a steep discount relatively to, for example, the 2-year benchmark bond (maturity 2014)].
Although the example in Chart 3 may represent a somewhat more extreme situation than is usually the case, it is sufficient to demonstrate that 'relative value' can be a somewhat slippery concept. For this reason is it often not possible to quantify in a robust and precise fashion the cost effectiveness of exchanges and buybacks. Even if the buyback premium could be accurately measured, then it would still be a challenge to quantify the expected cost savings related to the faster build-up of (more liquid) on-therun securities that these operations would allow. In sum, exchanges and buybacks may have beneficial effects but their exact quantification is likely to be problematic. 
How much can realistically be bought back?
Chart 4 illustrates the experience of Denmark with respect to buybacks over the past 10 years. Two years prior to maturity, the outstanding amounts of most bonds were close to the maximum observed during their lifespan. The general pattern is that buybacks (and to a lesser extent bond exchanges) have reduced outstanding amounts from 24 to 12 months prior to maturity, but more markedly during the last 12 months prior to maturity. Prior to maturity, outstanding amounts have been reduced by an average of 40 per cent. -23 -22 -21 -20 -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 - • A 1996 survey led by the Italian WPDM delegation focused on bond buyback practices and their impact on public debt management. Of the 22 responding countries, 14 used buybacks.
• A 2001 questionnaire among EU countries showed that of the 13 responding countries, 10 used both bond exchanges and buybacks.
• A 2006 survey was led by the Hungarian and Italian WPDM delegations. Of the 23 responding countries, 17 countries had either a bond exchange or a buyback programme in place.
The survey reported in this paper was circulated among OECD countries in 2011. The results show that the use of these operations has significantly increased in the last couple of years. Most OECD members now conduct either bond exchange or bond buyback operations. Among the 33 respondents, only 4 countries reported not to carry out any such operations ( Table 1) . In Germany, buyback operations are part of the daily secondary market operations. However, no announcements are made ahead of operations and no post-trading data are disclosed. Germany conducts buybacks mainly to smooth the redemption profile and to mitigate refinancing risk.
The Hungarian debt management agency (ÁKK) holds (on Wednesdays) regular bi-weekly buyback auctions for bonds with a term-to-maturity of less than 1.5 years, except in months with a maturing bond.
Buyback dates are announced in the annual auction calendar, but which lines are targeted as buyback is announced only a week prior to the auction. However, these reverse auctions have not been held since 2001. Currently, the DMO conducts regularly buybacks (as a secondary market operation) of close-to-maturity bonds for cash flow smoothing purposes.
Countries that hold buyback operations on an irregular or ad hoc basis
Many OECD countries carry out buyback operations on an ad-hoc basis. Austria organises buybacks on a case by case basis, taking into account the overall strategy and risk-return profile. A buyback operation is executed if it is judged that there is scope for an improvement in the maturity and risk profile of the debt stock.
The Czech Republic debt management office (DMO CZ) conducts buyback operations in order to manage refinancing risk. To that end, the DMO buys back bonds with a remaining maturity of one year.
Buybacks are conducted both as primary market operations and in the secondary market.
Greece carries out buybacks on a fairly irregular basis and for relatively small amounts. The maximum amount of buybacks is approved annually and updated according to market conditions.
In the past, the Icelandic DMO conducted debt buybacks on a regular basis as part of the strategy to reduce the non-marketable portion of the debt stock. The reverse auction was the most common method.
Currently, debt buybacks are carried out on an irregular basis. The initiative usually comes from the holders of the debt. Buybacks are mainly executed as secondary market operations.
Buyback operations in Italy are considered as extraordinary operations, not subject to a fixed annual calendar. Operations are funded by regular cash surpluses and funds available from the Sinking Fund 7 for Government bonds. In Mexico, buybacks are subject to market conditions and used as a complementary tool for exchanges (switches). The last buyback operation was conducted in 2008 to mitigate the imbalances in the local currency bond market as a result of very high volatility in financial markets.
7
The Sinking Fund was set up in 1993 aimed at reducing the government debt stock by buying back bonds or repaying at maturity. The Sinking Fund's financial resources include privatization revenues and (other) extraordinary income. Switzerland conducts buybacks in connection with cash management operations (maturities up to 12 months). Such buybacks are only being executed if the yields resulting from these operations are expected to be favourable relative to alternative short-term investments.
New Zealand
In Spain, a buyback programme was in place between 1999 and 2006. The size of the programme amounted to more than €35 billion (Chart 6). Spain's favourable cash position in that period allowed the execution of these buyback operations. The programme was discontinued to avoid a liquidity drain at the short end of the Spanish yield curve. Usually Turkish buyback operations were conducted on an ad-hoc basis. However, in the period of September -December 2010, buybacks were conducted on a regular basis, while the securities to be bought back (13 buyback auctions were completed) were announced in the monthly domestic borrowing calendar. Only primary dealers can participate in buyback auctions.
The US Treasury used debt buybacks in the early 2000s to manage the maturity structure of the debt portfolio. In that period with budget surpluses, the Treasury achieved this goal by buying back long-term securities while selling shorter-term maturities via 45 reverse auctions.
Why do you conduct debt buybacks?
The dominant motive behind bond buybacks is "to smooth the redemption profile" and "to mitigate refinancing risk" (19 countries mentioned this reason; Table 6 ). "To increase liquidity" and "to offset large cash income and remove small stocks" are two other reasons mentioned by OECD DMOs. Only Italy reported to use debt buybacks also "to correct distortions in the secondary market due to central bank purchases of government securities". One of them is to support managing the cash position of the government. Denmark conducts buyback operations in order to invest the surplus cash obtained through the excess sale of bonds. Canada carries out weekly cash management buybacks to help meeting the government's cash requirements by (1) reducing the high levels of government cash balances needed on key redemption dates as well as (2) smoothing the variations in the issuance of treasury bills during the year. The Slovak Republic buys back bonds in order to keep the liquidity buffer within certain limits. The Hungarian DMO carries out buyback operations to smooth the end-of-the-day balance of the Treasury Single Account.
Another indirect objective concerns the management of the yield curve. Mexico and Slovenia is using buybacks to manage their yield curves. Mexico manages the short end of the yield curve with buyback operations. Slovenia contributes to the building of a yield curve of the government securities and supports an effective positioning of the central government debt in the financial market via buyback operations.
At the beginning of 2000s, France's AFT buyback programme was mainly aimed at increasing its gross issuing programme so as to ensure sufficient liquidity for the new benchmarks while contributing to the goal of reducing duration in the medium-term. However, in recent years, the motives for conducting buybacks have shifted towards smoothing the redemption profile and cost of issuance.
Israel conducts buyback operations in order to improve the tradability and liquidity of the government bond market and to upgrade the service to the organizations that operate in this market.
Norwegian buyback operations are done in response to market requirements and not because of the needs of the issuer.
Canada buys back bonds for cash management purposes with a term to maturity of up to 18 months if the total amount of maturing bonds is greater than $5 billion at the date of the operation. However, for bond buybacks on a cash basis, eligibility criteria are wider and the bond buybacks target both illiquid high-coupon bonds and certain large, off-the-run issues. Issues that are currently being built as benchmarks as well as bonds with maturities greater than or equal to 25 years are excluded from the buyback program.
The decision on specific bonds to be included in buyback operations takes into account the views of market participants and is announced at the Call for Tenders.
The Italian Treasury uses the following selection criteria. The first criterion is the shape of the redemption profile whereby buyback bonds are selected that show reimbursement peaks at redemption dates. The second criterion is liquidity whereby the Treasury selects off-the-runs aimed at avoiding a negative impact on secondary market liquidity. The third criterion is the (potential) impact on outstanding debt. In order to smooth the public debt redemption profile, the Italian Treasury traditionally repurchases bonds with a residual maturity up to 18 months (taking into account market conditions). However, in order to minimise the distortions observed in the secondary market due to the ECB bond-buying program (expanded in August 2011) the Italian Treasury has also taken the opportunity to buy back government securities with longer than 18 months residual maturity.
When asked by a primary dealer, the UKDMO is prepared to bid a price of its own choosing for any gilt, including any strip, which has less than six months left before its maturity. Gilts with this residual maturity function essentially as money market instruments. For this reason the bid price will be dictated by the (needs of) DMO's cash management operations at the time of request. 
Please specify the methods used for buybacks
Reverse auctions
Secondary market purchases
Other methods
Austria conducts buyback operations in the secondary market usually by bilateral negotiations.
The Australian central bank has holdings of near-to-maturity bonds that it has acquired through its daily open-market operations. The central bank is prepared to sell these bonds to the Government at the prevailing secondary market price.
The Belgian Treasury uses since July 2001 MTS Belgium (MTSB) for buybacks. This electronic platform offers liquidity, efficiency and transparent pricing. Buybacks are carried out via a screen which only the primary dealers and the Treasury can access, and on which the Treasury continuously displays the purchase prices. When an OLO line reaches a date less than 12 months prior to its final maturity, the Treasury offers it via a buyback.
In Canada, buyback operations are held 20 minutes after nominal bond auctions. Each quarterly bond issuance calendar includes the targeted amount of bonds that the government intends to repurchase during that quarter. Final details of each operation, including the maximum amount to be repurchased and the basket of eligible bonds, are released the week prior to the operation. However, bond buybacks for cash management purposes are held on an irregular basis to meet government cash management needs. These "cash management bond buyback operations" target large bonds with less than 18 months to maturity.
They are held on almost each Tuesday morning after Treasury bill auctions. Details of the operations, including the maximum amount to be repurchased and the basket of eligible bonds, are announced one week in advance. Both type of buyback operation are settled on a cash basis and take place via multiple yield reverse auctions. In all bond buyback operations, competitive offers are accepted in decreasing order of yield (increasing order of price) until the maximum amount to repurchase (or the maximum replacement amount) has been met.
The Czech DMO informs all primary dealers about the intention to conduct a transaction one business day prior to the date on which the transaction is to occur. The primary dealers are notified about the type of transaction, the targeted government bond, the maximum volume of the transaction, the time when bids or offers from primary dealers can be submitted via the system and the date of settlement. At the time when offers are accepted from primary dealers, the primary dealers may submit their prices and the volume to the system. Afterwards, depending on the price and the volume, the DMO will either accept or reject the offer. The submission of offers via the system is anonymous, and before each transaction the DMO will not have any information about which primary dealer is participating in the submission of offers or information about the price and volume offered by a particular primary dealer. The DMO publishes the result of the transactions on its website by the date of settlement of the transactions.
Buybacks in Italy can be conducted via a competitive (multi-price) auction or Treasury mandate. Table 9 describes the principal features of the two methods for buyback operations. The choice of methodology depends on the quantity to be bought back and market conditions. If the amounts are large, then the Treasury usually buys back bonds via multiple price auctions. Bilateral transactions are preferred for smaller amounts. In both cases, only Specialists in Government Bonds (primary dealers) are eligible counterparties for buybacks. Buyback operations are officially announced through a press release. A few days later another press release announces which bonds are targeted. Market conditions are the main factor behind the decision to go ahead with a buyback operation. The Italian treasury reserves the right to adjust the terms of the operation in case of a sudden change in the financial market environment. The buyback auction is held at the Bank of Italy using its electronic auction platform (it is very similar to an ordinary government bond auction).
In Slovenia, buybacks are executed by competitive bidding, using the electronic Bloomberg Auction System (BAS), on the basis of the Rules of the Republic of Slovenia Government Securities' Auctions.
Buybacks are organised after an announcement addressed to bondholders on the MoF website. The invitation to primary dealers to participate in the auction is sent by e-mail and BAS, five business days before the buyback auction. The primary dealers submit the buyback bids in their own name and for their own account as well in the name and for the account of other bond holders. Bids are selected (and accepted) immediately after the closing time for submission of bids. Bids are ranked in increasing order of price until the cut-off price 8 is reached. Bids with prices lower or equal than the cut-off price may be 8
The cut-off price will be determined as the difference of the sum of the average annual net present values of the cash flows of all bonds eligible for buyback in the auction and the average annual net present value of the cash flow of the new benchmark issue, being equal to or higher than zero.
allotted on a pro-rata basis. The auction results are published on the MoF website, as well as through Reuters and Bloomberg. Secondary market purchases of government securities are also allowed by the Slovenian Public Finance Act. However, thus far, due to budgetary constraints, this type of buyback operation has not been executed.
In Portugal, the main guidelines of the debt buyback programme are announced at the beginning of the year with further details on a quarterly basis. The methods used for buyback operations include reverse auctions and bilateral transactions. The choice of buyback method depends importantly on the degree of illiquidity of targeted bonds. Reverse auctions are primarily used to target OTs with a less than 15 months residual maturity (which, thus far, were subject to market-making obligations in MEDIP/MTS Portugal).
Reverse auctions are organised by IGCP as multi-price competitive auctions (where participants submit the amount of stock they are prepared to sell and the yield they are willing to accept), supported by the electronic Bloomberg Auction System BAS. Bilateral operations are used to target securities that are considered highly illiquid in the sense that the buyback offer must be maintained during a long period of time in order to identify (sufficient) investors willing to sell their positions in these highly illiquid bonds, including old and illiquid OTs (which were never under market making obligations on MTS Portugal), foreign bonds, Eurobonds, loans or legacy loans. The price of the bonds being bought back in bilateral operations is set against the swap curve (demanding a 'premium' over the cost of funding of the Republic on relevant maturities). Thus far, bilateral operations have been done via the phone and Bloomberg.
As noted, Turkey used buybacks in the period September-December 2010 on a regular basis.
Buyback securities were announced one day prior to the auction day on the Treasury website. In that period, auctions were held on Thursdays with settlement date on Friday. Investors submitted their bids in terms of price and nominal amount until 01:30 pm. Securities were bought back through multiple price auctions. The weekly maximum buyback amount was TRY 200 million. In case the price at the auction was not judged to reflect market conditions, Treasury bought back less than the maximum amount or nothing at all.
In New Zealand, buybacks are advertised daily between 10am -noon and 2pm -4pm. Banks can submit offers, although the central banks is not obliged to accept all or any bids. Buybacks in Denmark can take place via switch auction or tap. The commonly used method In Greece for buybacks is over-thecounter transactions with primary dealers. The Slovak Republic executes buybacks via bilateral negotiations. Switzerland conducts buybacks as secondary market operations.
Bond exchanges (switches)
Among the 33 respondents, 18 DMOs (39% of the respondents) use bond exchanges (switches) (Table 10) The latter example is the use of switches as market-friendly solutions to resume market access and to ease near-term redemption pressures. It may also be a way of issuing again in the primary market with longer maturities. Ireland (see below) executed two switches that were seen as a creative use of switches as a way of demonstrating market access and smooth out and lengthen its redemption profile. 
Countries with regular exchange operations
Only seven countries (39% of the respondents; The Hungarian DMO (AKK) conducts once a month bond exchanges. Only primary dealers can directly submit bids in the exchange auctions (hence, others need to submit bids through a primary dealer).
Sweden conducts regularly bond exchanges only for linkers (inflation-linked bonds). set a weekly and daily volume limit to each primary dealer and bond. The Swedish national debt office offers a switch facility with irregular schedule for other bonds. 
Countries that hold exchange operations on an ad hoc basis
A total of 11 countries (61% ; Table 10 
Objectives of bond exchanges
The principal objective why DMOs execute bond exchange operations is to "smooth the redemption profile and mitigate the financing risk". 13 out of 14 respondents mentioned this objective ( Table 11 ). The second most important objective is "to increase liquidity" in the secondary market by buying back illiquid off-the-run securities and boosting the volume of benchmark issues (10 out of 14 respondents; Table 11 ).
Three countries (Ireland, Israel and Italy) carry out exchange operations also to correct distortions in the secondary market due to Central Bank purchases of government securities. • As a structural operation tool (transition to the euro) (Spain)
• To increase maturity of the domestic debt stock (Turkey)
• To avoid possible price distortions due to high concentration in some securities (Mexico)
Which costs are associated with exchanges?
The main costs associated with bond exchange operations are associated with price movements between the announcement of, and the close of, the operation (market risk). Eleven respondents out of thirteen consider this cost the most important one ( Table 12 ). As noted, Canada conducts switch operations on a duration neutral basis so as to minimise market risk.
"Budgetary costs" and "reputational risk" are equally weighted by responded countries. Poland observes in this context that they manage their reputational risk by consulting with primary dealers about source and destination bonds. Clearly, an exchange above par has potentially a large budget impact. This is especially relevant for long bonds with high coupons. Indeed, from the Survey it appears that countries normally refrain from "locking in unattractive forward rates".
Spain notes that during crisis periods, exchange operations might be interpreted by some market participants as a signal that the issuer expects difficulties with future redemptions. In response, 'the market' could ask a premium, thereby increasing the cost of the switch operation.
Selection criteria for source bonds in switch operations
The main criterion used by respondents for selecting source bonds (bond bought back in switch operations) is the maturity profile. Almost all respondent countries (10 out of 13; Table 13 ) use "nearing redemption" as the most relevant criterion for selecting the source bond. However, in practice this criterion may have a wide meaning. For instance, in Canada, buyback operations on a switch basis involve the exchange of less-liquid bonds with a remaining term to maturity of 12 months to 25 years. Hungary exchanges bonds with a term-to-maturity of less than 2 years. Italy normally exchanges bonds with a residual maturity of 18 months or less (but when it is judged that the switch may lead to an increase in the efficiency of the market, also longer maturities can be switched).
Source bonds are usually off-the-runs and therefore fairly illiquid. Consequently, the second most important criterion for exchanging bonds is whether they are off-the-run and have lost their liquidity in secondary markets (Table 13) . Austria, Canada, Israel and Slovenia also mention high coupon bonds as a target for source bonds (Table 13) . Canada specifically excludes the following bonds from switch operations: issues currently being built as benchmarks in the 2-, 3-, 5-, or 10-year sectors, the current benchmark issues in these sectors, the preceding benchmark issue in the 10-year sector, as well as bonds with maturities greater than or equal to 25 years.
Methods for conducting exchange operations
Countries use two methods for conducting exchange operations. Some countries auction the destination bond, while fixing the price of the source bond, and others auction the source bond, while fixing the price of the destination bond. Besides these two (polar) options there are countries such as Turkey and Israel that use both methods.
zero-coupon curve model, with references to swap and Treasury bill curves, where appropriate. Results are released on a "best efforts basis".
The Danish DMO announces a price it will pay for the source bond as well as a so-called hedge ratio.
Dealers then submit bid prices for the destination bond.
In Hungary, the price for the source bond is fixed 5 minutes before the exchange auction. PDs are requested to quote two-way prices for the source bonds. The 2 best and the 2 worst quotes are excluded from the calculation. The fixed price is the average of the remaining quotes. The exchange auction is then executed for the destination bond. Settlement is based on the delivery-versus-delivery (DVD) method.
The Italian Treasury holds exchange transaction using two procedures (Table 15) : (1) via exchange auctions (in the primary market) and (2) through an electronic trading system (in the secondary market).
The exchange auctions are organised as single price auctions (held at the Bank of Italy through its IT network), where one bond is exchanged against up to 10 bonds. The second procedure means that the Treasury directly operates in the secondary market through an electronic platform, with multi-price allotment, and where one bond is exchanged against up to 5 bonds. In Ireland, switches can be initiated at the discretion by the NTMA at any time during official market hours. The market is informed by the NTMA via the Bloomberg message system. The initial amount of bonds available for switching and the associated price terms are communicated electronically to all the PDs at the same time. The bidding window is two minutes, during which period bids will be accepted directly from the PDs via the Bloomberg message system. The NTMA reserves the right to simultaneously issue one or more new bonds via the switching mechanism. The NTMA can also offer bond switching facilities in response to direct requests from PDs to help them in managing their positions. Switches dealt between a PD and the NTMA will be priced, in the normal course, at the current bid or offer levels, as the case may be, obtaining in the market.
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In Poland, switch operations are organised as multi-price auctions. The MoF announces the price for the source bond on the last working day before the auction. Primary dealers submit then bids in terms of nominal amount of source bonds and price for the destination bond. Finally, the MoF makes a decision about the lowest accepted price (minimum or stop price) of the destination bond.
In Slovenia, a switch is executed following a public announcement with an offer, addressed to the bondholders of the bonds to be exchanged, to participate in an exchange auction of the source bond. The announcement is published on the MoF website at least four business days before the day of the auction.
Before each switch auction, the PDs receive an invitation to submit bids. The exchange ratio between the source bond and the destination bond is determined based on the bid price of the source bond and the price of the destination bond.
In Portugal, bond exchanges can be conducted via two procedures: (1) exchange offers (fixed price exchanges) and (2) through reverse auctions immediately followed by regular auctions. Procedure one (an exchange offer) has been conducted by the DMO (IGCP) only once. The exchange offer was based on a fixed-price exchange between the new issue and the old one. IGCP has never conducted a pure exchange auction. Instead, two separate back-to-back auctions are executed: (a) a multi-price reverse auction followed one hour later by (b) a multi-price regular auction. In both auctions, the exchanged (bought back) bonds and newly issued bonds are settled against cash.
The Spanish Treasury sets the price of the new bond (usually based on the secondary market price).
Investors state in their bids both the nominal value and the price at which they wish to exchange.
Exchanges use the competitive auction format, with the Treasury deciding the cut-off price. On the day of the auction, the Bank of Spain gives the price of the new bonds exchangeable for the old one, and participants enter their bids accordingly. Any individual or legal entity (both resident and non-resident), is eligible to participate. The results of the auction are announced immediately after the operation. 
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For more information: http://www.tesoro.es/en/deuda/mercados/mprimario/canjes.asp
The Turkish Treasury sets either the price of the source bond or the price of the destination bond.
The exchange ratio between these two securities is determined via an exchange auction (both fixed price and multiple price options are available). Primary dealers have the exclusive right to participate in switch auctions.
